

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

23.4.5.6 Audit, Review, and Penalties for Physical Withholding to Increase Market-Clearing Prices; Alignment with ~~Generator Deactivation Process~~ Short-Term Reliability Process

23.4.5.6.1 Audit and Review of Proposals or Decisions to Remove or Derate Installed Capacity from a Mitigated Capacity Zone

Any proposal or decision by a Market Participant to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from a Mitigated Capacity Zone Unforced Capacity market, or to de-rate the amount of Installed Capacity available from such supplier, may be subject to audit and review by the ISO if the ISO determines that such action could reasonably be expected to affect Market-Clearing Prices in one or more ICAP Spot Market Auctions for a Mitigated Capacity Zone in which the Resource(s) that is the subject of the proposal or decision is located, subsequent to such action; provided, however, no audit and review shall be necessary if the Installed Capacity Supplier is a Generator that is being retired or removed from a Mitigated Capacity Zone as the result of a Forced Outage that began on or after May 1, 2015 that was determined by the ISO to be a Catastrophic Failure.

The ISO's audit or review of any proposal or decision by a Market Participant to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from a Mitigated Capacity Zone Unforced Capacity market, or to de-rate the amount of Installed Capacity available from such supplier, (including a review the ISO conducts at the request of a Market Participant before it submits a proposal or makes a decision or a review the NYISO conducts in conjunction with the Short-Term Reliability Process) will consider the rationale offered by the Market Participant to support its proposal or decision. Such an audit or review shall assess whether the Market Participant's proposal or decision has a legitimate economic justification, which may include the economics of complying with regulatory requirements, or is based on an effort to withhold Installed Capacity

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG physically in order to affect prices. The ISO's audit or review is conducted based on the expectation that a Market Participant's decision to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from a Mitigated Capacity Zone, or to de-rate the amount of Installed Capacity available from such supplier, accounts for the information available to that Market Participant at (or before) the time its decision is made. A Market Participant may offer publicly available information and other information available to the Market Participant to support its proposal or decision.

The ISO shall provide the preliminary results of its audit or review to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and comment. The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Mitigation Measures are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.2.10 of Attachment O to this Services Tariff.

23.4.5.6.2 Audit and Review of the Reclassification of a Generator in a Mitigated Capacity Zone From a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage

This Section 23.4.5.6.2 shall apply to a Market ~~Party~~Participant whose Installed Capacity Supplier is a Generator that began a Forced Outage on or after May 1, 2015.

23.4.5.6.2.1 Any reclassification of an Installed Capacity Supplier that is a Generator in a Mitigated Capacity Zone from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage by a Market ~~Party~~Participant or otherwise, pursuant to the terms of Section 5.18.2.1 of this Services Tariff, may be subject to audit and review by the ISO if the ISO determines that such reclassification could reasonably be expected to affect the Market-Clearing Price in one or more ICAP Spot Market Auctions for a Mitigated Capacity Zone in which the Generator(s) that is the subject of the reclassification is located, subsequent to such action; provided, however, if the

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

Market ~~Party's~~ Participant's Generator experienced the Forced Outage as a result of a Catastrophic Failure, the reclassification of a Generator in a Mitigated Capacity Zone from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage shall not be subject to audit and review pursuant to this Section 23.4.5.6.2.

The audit and review pursuant to the above paragraph shall assess whether the reclassification of the Generator in a Mitigated Capacity Zone from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage had a legitimate economic justification or is based on an effort to withhold Installed Capacity physically in order to affect prices. A Market Participant may offer publicly available information and other information available to the Market Participant to justify the reclassification.

The ISO shall provide the preliminary results of its audit or review to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and comment. The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Mitigation Measures are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.2.10 of Attachment O to this Services Tariff.

23.4.5.6.2.2 The audit and review pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2.1 shall be deferred by the ISO beyond the time period established in ISO Procedures for the audit and review of a reclassification of a Generator from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage if the Generator was in a Forced Outage for at least 180 days before the reclassification and one or more Exceptional Circumstances delayed the acquisition of data necessary for the ISO's audit and review.

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

The ISO shall conduct the audit and review after its receipt of data that it determines is necessary for the audit and review; provided, however, if, at the time the ISO acquires the necessary data, the Market Party-Participant has Commenced Repair of the Generator, or the Generator is determined by the ISO to have had a Catastrophic Failure, the Market Party-Participant shall not be subject to an audit and review pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2.1 of this Services Tariff. A Generator that Commenced Repair while in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage but that ceased or unreasonably delayed that repair shall be subject to audit and review by the ISO pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2.1 of this Services Tariff.

The ISO shall provide the preliminary results of its audit or review to the Market Monitoring Unit for its review and comment. The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Mitigation Measures are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.2.10 of Attachment O to this Service Tariff.

23.4.5.6.2.3 The audit and review of the removal of a Generator from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage, and the determinations of Catastrophic Failure and Exceptional Circumstances, will be pursuant to specific timelines established in ISO Procedures.

23.4.5.6.2.4 The audit and review pursuant to Sections 23.4.5.6.2.1, and 23.4.5.6.2.2 shall be conducted to determine whether the decision not to repair a Generator had a legitimate economic justification, consistent with competitive behavior; that is, whether the cost of repair, including the risk-adjusted cost of capital, could not

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

reasonably be expected to be recouped over the reasonably anticipated remaining life of the ~~generator~~Generator. The elements of such audit and review may include, as appropriate, the historical revenue and maintenance cost data for the purpose of the baseline, the duration of the repair, the costs including, but not limited to, capital expenditures necessary to comply with federal or state environmental, safety or reliability requirements that must be met in order to operate the Generator, the anticipated capacity, energy and ancillary services revenues following the repair, the projected costs of operating the Generator following the repair, any benefits that would be foregone from using the site for a purpose other than as the existing Generator (e.g., repowering), and other relevant data.

The criteria for the audit and review provided in this Services Tariff Section 23.4.5.6.2.4 may be incorporated, as appropriate, in an audit and review required to be conducted pursuant to other provisions in this Services Tariff Section 23.4.

23.4.5.6.2.5 For a requesting Market PartyParticipant, a determination that the Market PartyParticipant has experienced Exceptional Circumstances shall be made by the ISO by the 160th day of the Generator's Forced Outage. The ISO shall use reasonable efforts to issue a determination that a Market PartyParticipant has experienced Exceptional Circumstances after it has Commenced Repair and requests reclassification to an ICAP Ineligible Force Outage by the 40th day after the ISO's receipt of data necessary to conduct the analysis.

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

For a requesting Market PartyParticipant, a determination that a Generator

has experienced a Catastrophic Failure shall be made by the ISO by the 160th day of the Forced Outage. If the ISO has determined that Exceptional Circumstances will delay the submission of data necessary for the ISO to perform an audit and review pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2.1 or 23.4.5.6.2, the ISO shall use reasonable efforts to issue a determination that the Generator has experienced a Catastrophic Failure by the 40th day after receipt of data necessary to conduct the analysis.

23.4.5.6.3 Penalties for Withholding Installed Capacity Physically In Order To Affect Prices

If the ISO determines that either: i) pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.1, the proposal or decision by a Market PartyParticipant to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from a Mitigated Capacity Zone, or to de-rate the amount of Installed Capacity available from such supplier, or ii) pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2, the ISO determines that the reclassification of an Installed Capacity Supplier that is a Generator from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage constitutes physical withholding, and would increase the Market-Clearing Price in one or more ICAP Spot Market Auctions for a Mitigated Capacity Zone by five percent or more, provided such increase is at least \$.50/kilowatt-month, for each such violation of the above requirements the Market PartyParticipant shall be assessed an amount equal to the product of (A) 1.5 times the difference between the Market Clearing Price for the Mitigated Capacity Zone in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions with and without the inclusion of the withheld UCAP in those auctions, and (B) the total of (1) the number of megawatts withheld in the month and (2) all other megawatts of Installed Capacity in the Mitigated Capacity Zone under common Control with such withheld megawatts in the month. The requirement to pay such amounts shall

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

continue until the Market Party Participant demonstrates that the removal from service,

retirement, or de-rate, as described in Section 23.4.5.6.1, or reclassification as described in

Section 23.4.5.6.2 is justified by economic considerations other than the effect of such action on

Market-Clearing Prices in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions for the Mitigated Capacity Zone. The

ISO will distribute any amount recovered in accordance with the foregoing provisions among the

LSEs serving Loads in the Mitigated Capacity Zone(s) wherein the Market-Clearing Price was

affected for the month corresponding to the penalty accordance with ISO Procedures.

23.4.5.6.4 Aligning Physical Withholding Audits and Reviews with the ~~Generator Deactivation Process~~ Short-Term Reliability Process

The rules in this Section 23.4.5.6.4 apply to Market Participants that initiate the

~~Generator Deactivation Process~~ Short-Term Reliability Process that is set forth in Attachment FF

to the ISO OATT by submitting a Generator Deactivation Notice for a Generator. They provide

an opportunity for such a Market Participant to receive a final physical withholding

determination from the ISO before the Market Participant deactivates the Generator. Nothing in

Attachment FF to the OATT or in this Section 23.4.5.6.4 of the ISO Services Tariff should be

read as limiting the ISO's authority to impose a physical withholding penalty on a Generator that

deactivates. Capitalized terms that appear in this Section 23.4.5.6.4 that are not defined in

Article 2 to the ISO Services Tariff are defined in Section 38.1 of Attachment FF to the ISO

OATT.

23.4.5.6.4.1 If the ISO has issued notice to the Market Participant or Generator Owner

(as that term is defined in Section 38.1 of the ISO OATT) in accordance with

Section 38.7.4 of Attachment FF to the ISO OATT that it has received all of the

data and information it requires to perform its duties under both the ~~Generator~~

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG ~~Deactivation Process~~ Short-Term Reliability Process that is set forth in

Attachment FF to the ISO OATT and Section 23 of the ISO Services Tariff, then the ISO shall complete a physical withholding review of the proposed deactivation, if needed, in accordance with Section 23.4.5.6 of the ISO Services Tariff and issue a final physical withholding determination to the Market ~~Party~~ Participant in accordance with the process set forth in Sections 23.4.5.6.4.2.1 or 23.4.5.6.4.2.2 of the ISO Services Tariff.

If the ISO has not issued a notice to the Market Participant or Generator Owner in accordance with Section 38.7.4 of Attachment FF to the ISO OATT that it has received all of the data and information it requires to perform its duties under both Attachment FF to the ISO OATT and Section 23 of the ISO Services Tariff, then the ISO is *not* required to issue a final physical withholding determination to the Market ~~Party~~ Participant for the Generator prior to the Generator's deactivation.

23.4.5.6.4.2 **Aligning Issuance of Final Physical Withholding Determination with the ~~Generator Deactivation Process~~ Short-Term Reliability Process**

23.4.5.6.4.2.1 **Based on deactivation date.** At least ninety days before the date the Generator determines it will timely (consistent with Section 38.14.1 of Attachment FF to the ISO OATT) deactivate, the Market Participant (which is also a Market Party) may notify the ISO in writing of the updated deactivation date and request that the ISO issue a final physical withholding determination to the Market ~~Party~~ Participant. The ISO shall issue its final determination at least 60 days before the updated deactivation date specified in the Market Participant's written notice. For purposes of the ISO's audit or review conducted in

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG accordance with Section 23.4.5.6.2.1 above, the date on which the Generator is proposed to be deactivated shall be the date on which the Market Participant's decision to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from a Mitigated Capacity Zone is made.

Exception: The earliest date the ISO shall be required to issue a final physical withholding determination is 90 days after the ~~Generator Deactivation Assessment~~Short-Term Assessment of Reliability Start Date.

The ISO's final physical withholding determination shall only be valid if the Generator becomes Retired or enters into a Mothball Outage within a window that starts five days before the date specified in the Market Participant's notice to the ISO and concludes ten days after the date specified in the Market Participant's notice to the ISO.

23.4.5.6.4.2.2 Based on date of irrevocable action or inaction. If the Market Participant identifies and the ISO, in consultation with the Market Monitoring Unit, agrees that there is a point in the process of deactivating a Generator after which the deactivation process will become, essentially and practicably, irreversible, then the ISO shall inform the Market Participant in writing of the first such act, decision not to act, or event that the ISO agrees will have irreversible consequences.

The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Mitigation Measures are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.2.12 of Attachment O to this Services Tariff.

23.4.5.6.4.2.2.1 At least ninety days before the date the irreversible action, inaction or event specified by the ISO in its notice to the Market Participant will be taken, occur or come to pass (the “trigger date”), the Market Participant may notify the ISO in writing of the trigger date and request that the ISO issue a final physical withholding determination to the Market ~~Party~~Participant. The Market Participant’s notice must explain why the date it selected is the appropriate trigger date. If the ISO determines that the trigger date specified by the Market Participant is reasonable, then the ISO shall issue its final physical withholding determination at least 60 days before the trigger date specified in the Market Participant’s notice. For purposes of the ISO’s audit or review conducted in accordance with Section 23.4.5.6.2.1 above, the trigger date shall be the date on which the Market Participant’s decision to retire or otherwise remove an Installed Capacity Supplier from a Mitigated Capacity Zone is made.

Exception: The earliest date the ISO shall be required to issue a final physical withholding determination is 90 days after the ~~Generator Deactivation Assessment~~Short-Term Assessment of Reliability Start Date.

23.4.5.6.4.2.2.2 If the ISO determines that the trigger date the Market Participant specified is not reasonable, then the ISO shall promptly notify the Market Participant of its determination and the reasons therefor in writing. The ISO is not required to issue a final physical withholding determination unless the Market ~~Party~~Participant provides additional information within two business days of the issuance of the ISO’s written determination that causes the ISO to change its decision.

This does not include proposed tariff language pertaining to the Class Year Redesign project or the Competitive Entry Exemption Enhancement project currently being discussed in ICAPWG

23.4.5.6.4.2.2.3 The ISO's final physical withholding determination shall only be valid if (a) the specified irreversible action, inaction or event is taken or occurs within a window that starts five days before the trigger date specified in the Market Participant's notice to the ISO and concludes ten days after the trigger date specified in the Market Participant's notice to the ISO, and (b) the Generator timely (consistent with Section 38.14.1 of Attachment FF to the ISO OATT) enters into a Mothball Outage or becomes Retired. Except where the ISO possesses contrary information, the ISO shall accept the Market Participant's reasonable assessment of the date by which an irrevocable failure to act occurs.

23.4.5.6.4.3 The Market ~~Party~~ Participant shall promptly send a written notice to the ISO rescinding a written notice that it previously submitted under Sections 23.4.5.6.4.2.1 or 23.4.5.6.4.2.2.1 of the ISO Services Tariff if it determines that the deactivation date or trigger date it specified in its written notice to the ISO is no longer accurate.